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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Larry Mark Lake appeals from his conviction for felony DUI. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Lake with felony DUI.  (R., pp. 90-93.)  Lake moved to 
suppress evidence, claiming that his traffic stop was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion.  (R., pp. 106-09.)  The district court found the officer saw two ATVs 
driving on a road in a residential area, then pull over.  (R., pp. 133.1)  The officer 
approached and saw the ATVs did not have license plates, registrations, 
headlights, turn signals, or rearview mirrors.  (R., pp. 133-34.)  It was getting dark 
at that time.  (R., p. 134.)  The officer then initiated a traffic stop. (R., p. 134.)  
Lake, one of the operators of an ATV, was ultimately arrested for DUI.  (R., p. 
134.)  The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding the traffic stop 
was supported by reasonable suspicion the unregistered ATVs were being 
operated on a road contrary to vehicle registration laws.  (R., pp. 133-38.)   
 Lake entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 158-61.)  The court entered judgment 
and Lake filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 169-71; 176-78, 184-87.) 
 
                                            
1 A copy of the district court’s Order on Motion to Suppress is attached to this 






 Lake states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Lake’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
 (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Lake argues that the district court erred by not suppressing evidence, but 
does so “mindful” that the facts found by the district court (and unchallenged on 
appeal) support the district court’s determination that the traffic stop was justified 
by reasonable suspicion.  Has Lake failed to show error in the denial of his 








Lake Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
 
 The district court found that the officer saw both ATVs driving on a road in 
a residential area before she initiated the traffic stop.  (R., p. 133.)  She also saw 
the ATVs lacked license plates, lights and other indicia that the vehicles were 
legal to operate on that street at that time.  (R., pp. 133-36.)  Based on these 
factual findings the district court concluded that the officer had probable cause to 
believe that Lake was illegally operating an unregistered motor vehicle on a 
public road under I.C. § 49-426 (limiting use of unregistered ATVs on public 
roadways to agricultural purposes).  (R., pp. 135-36.)  Lake admits that the facts 
found by the district court “amount to reasonable suspicion for a lawful traffic 
stop,” but nonetheless “argues that the district court erred by denying his motion 
to suppress.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.)  Based on the district court’s decision, a 
copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference, and Lake’s 
acknowledgement that the traffic stop was lawful, the state submits that Lake has 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Lake’s conviction for 
felony DUI. 
 DATED this 19th day of February, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Joregensen_ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of February, 2016, served a 
true and correct digital copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by 
emailing the brief to: 
 
 JENNY C. SWINFORD 





      _/s/ Kenneth K. Joregensen  
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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CASE NO. CR-2014-979 
ORDER ON MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
On September 18, 2014, this matter came on for hearing before this Court on the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having received the post-hearing briefing, the Com1 now 
issues its findings of facts, conclusions of law, and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On May 27, 2014 Fruitland Police Officer Juanita Toll was on patrol duty in the City of 
Fruitland, Idaho when she received a dispatch to go to North Utah Street to check out a 
complaint ahout three ATV-type vehicles racing. She proceeded westbound on West First Street 
towards it's intersection with North Utah, and saw two ATVs, around the 600 block of West 
First Street, pull over to the side of the road near a sign. As she approached the ATVs, one of 
them circled around into the road and back onto the shoulder where it stopped next to the other 
ATV. This location was less than a block from North Utah Street. Neither of the two ATVs 
displayed a license plate or registration slicker. Neither had headlights, turns signals, or rearview 
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mirrors. It was already getting dark at that time. This area is exclusively a residential 
neighborhood area. 
Officer Toll effected a traffic stop, got out of her patrol car, and approached on foot. 
Defendant Lake was seated on one of the ATVs with the motor running and in gear, although the 
ATV was stationary on the gravel shoulder of West First Street. She asked the two men what 
was going on and Lake tried to explain that he had previously had a problem with some hispanic 
males in that area attempting to charge him a "toll" to use West First Street, a public road. Less 
than a minute into the conversation, Officer Toll asked Lake if he had been drinking and he 
answered that he had. After speaking to him some more about the circumstances, Officer Toll 
conducted field sobriety tests and eventually arrested Toll for DUI. 
The Defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that Officer Toll had no legal basis for 
the traffic stop. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The parties agree that the Defendant was seized when officer Toll parked her patrol car 
behind the A TVs and approached. Defendant contends there was no lawfol cause for this 
SC1ZlUe. 
A traffic stop hy an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates 
the Fomth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660,667 (1979); State v. 
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561,916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). Under tl1eFom1h 
Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, IOI S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628-29 
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(1981 ); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). The 
reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the 
time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,483,988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct.App.1999). The 
reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation 
or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. An ofilcer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts 
in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and 
law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319,321,756 P.2d 1083, 1085 
(Ct.App.1988). Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer 
fell within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior. Atkinson, 128 
Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Failing to stop for a stop sign constitutes grounds for a traffic 
stop. State v. Tierney, 109 [daho 474,476, 708 P.2d 879,881 (1985). 
The power to assess the credibility of wituesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh 
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court State v. Valdez-A,fo/ina, 127 
Idaho 102,897 P.2d 993 (1995). 
As explained more fully below, the Court concludes that Toll possessed facts sufficient to 
support a reasonable suspicion that Lake and the driver of the other A TV were operating the 
A TVs contrary to h·affic laws. Specifically, there was a reasonable suspicion that the A TVs 
were driven on a public road without being licensed or registered under l.C. § 49-426. That code 
section states: 
Motorcycles, motorbikes, utility type vehicles and all-terrain vehicles need not be 
licensed under the provisions of this chapter or numbered pursuant to the 
provisions of section 67-7122, Idaho Code, if they are being used exclusively in 
connection with agricultural, hmticultural, dairy and livestock growing and 
feeding operations or used exclusively for snow removal purposes. Travel upon 
the public highways shall be limited to travel between farm or ranch locations. 
Motorcycles, motorbikes, utility type vehicles and all-terrain vehicles used for this 
purpose shall meet the emblem requirements of section 49-61_2, Idaho Code. 
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Defendant argues that Officer Toll never witnessed Lake driving the ATV or even being 
on the paved roadway, and there is no requirement that Lake's ATV be registered ifit was 
simply parked on the shoulder. 
The Court disagrees with Defendant's position. First, the Court notes that Officer Toll 
twice testi ficd that she saw both A TVs "pull to the side" prior to seeing one of them (not the one 
driven by Lake) pull around into the road and back onto the shoulder. Given these 
circumstances, the Cami can infer and find that Toll saw both ATVs moving from the road to the 
shoulder. Lake's ATV was not simply parked on the shoulder. Given these findings, Toll had 
reasonable grounds to detain the drivers of both ATVs for driving the unregistered ATVs on a 
public road. This conclusion is supported by the following authority: 
Reed asse1is that when Officer Rouse discovered the tempmmy registration, he 
should have waved the vehicle's driver away and then departed instead of 
approaching the driver and requesting his driver's license and proof of insurance. 
Thus, according to Reed, the Fmuth Amendment was violated when Officer Rouse 
continued to detain Reed after the suspicion of a criminal offense was dispelled, and 
any evidence obtained through this violation must be suppressed .... 
This does not mean, however, that a traffic stop must necessarily be terminated at the 
instant the officer's suspicion of criminal activity is extinguished, for legitimate 
public interests other than the investigation of crime may justify a brief detention. In 
evaluating a Fourth Amendment claim, a balancing test is applied. "(T]he 
permissibility of a paiticular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its 
intrusion upon the individual's Fomth Amendment interests against its promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests." Delaware, 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396. See 
also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878, 95 S.Ct. at 2578-79. 
In State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 826 P.2d 452 (1992), the Idaho Supreme Court 
applied this balancing test to determine whether an officer was justified in requesting 
Godwin's driver's license even though he was not suspected of any offense. In that 
case, an Idaho State police officer had stopped a moto1ist for an equipment violation 
when a second vehicle, driven by Godwin, stopped about l 00 yards up the highway. 
Another officer, a county deputy sheriff, happened to drive by and stopped behlnd 
God\\~n's vehicle. The state police officer informed the deputy that the first motorist 
believed her driver's license was in Godwin's vehicle, as she and Godwin were 
traveling together. The other motorist's purse was located in Godwin's vehicle, but 
her driver's license was not found in it. The deputy then asked Godwin for his 
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driver's license. A status check of Godwin's license revealed that it had been 
suspended, and Godwin was then anested for driving with a suspended license. 
During a subsequent invento1y search of his car, a quantity of cocaine was found 
under the front seat. Godwin sought to suppress evidence of the cocaine on the 
theory that the police officer's request for his license was unreasonable. The Idaho 
Supreme Com1 affirmed the denial of Godwin's motion to suppress, holding that "a 
police officer's brief detention of a driver to mn a status check on the driver's license, 
after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the 
fourth amendment." Id. at 495, 826 P.2d at 456. The Comt explained its decision as 
follows: 
There are several reasons for permitting a police officer to ask for a driver's 
license under these circumstances. In making any stop, whether the stop is 
to enforce the trqffic lmvs or to cany out the officer's community caretaker 
jimction, an officer should be allowed to identify, with certainty, the person 
with whom he is dealing. This is necessmy to protect himse/f and other 
o,{ficers fi'Oln danger, to accurately prepare any required reports 
concerning his contact with the motorist, and to allow the officer to 
adequately respond to allegations o,f illegal conduct or improper behavior. 
Even if there is a legitimate public interest in requesting a driver's license 
and running a status check under the circumstances presented here, that 
interest must outweigh the nature of the intrusion in order to pass the Fourth 
Amendment test of reasonableness. \Ve note, however, that the intrusion 
here was minimal. Godwin was already stopped at the roadside when 
Deputy Barbieri arrived. The officer's initial contact with Godwin was to 
detcnnine whether he had Whitifield's driver's license. His further request 
for Godwin's license and his check on the status of that license constituted a 
very limited further encroaclunent upon any privacy interest protected by 
the Fourth Amendment. We therefore have little difficulty in concluding 
that such a limited intrusion was outweighed by the substantial public 
interest which supported Deputy Bmbieri's conduct. · 
Id, quoting the decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 
51 7, 520, 826 P.2d 4 78, 4 81 (Ct.App.1991 )( emphasis in original). 
For the reasons stated in Godwin, Officer Rouse's contact with Reed to request his 
driver's license met Fomih Amendment standards of reasonableness. After having 
made a lawful stop to determine whether Reed's vehicle was registered, Officer 
Rouse was entitled to ascertain the driver's identity even though the reason for that 
stop had dissipated. This slight prolongation of the traffic stop was a minimal 
intrusion and was not so burdensome as to outweigh the public interests, identified in 
Godwin, that are served by driver's license checks in these circumstances. '!11e same 
may be said for the officer's request to see Reed's certificate of liability insurance. 
There is a valid governmental interest in determining whether vehicles driven on 
Idaho's streets and highways are insured as required by law, and an officer's request 
for proof of insurance following a justified traffic stop adds only minimally to the 
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intrusion upon the motorist's privacy interests that are safeguarded by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503, 505-06, 927 P.2d 893, 895-96 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Here, Officer Toll was entitled to make a traffic stop to investigate the umegistered 
ATVs. Before a full minute had expired during her conversation with Lake, the reasonable 
suspicion ripened into a DUI investigation when Lake, who was seated on a motor vehicle, in 
gear ,,~th the engine running on the shoulder of a public road, admitted to consuming alcohol. 
See, e.g., State v. Rocha, 2014 Op. No. 81, Id. Ct. App. 
Therefore, for the aforementioned reasons: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED tliat Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 
-r""' 
Dated this _(Q_ day of November, 2014. 
~z:~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was 
forwarded to the following persons on this /7) day of November, 2014: 
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney 
11151'1 Ave. No. 
Payette, ID 8366 l 
Brett Schiller 
717 S. Kimball Ave, Ste 200 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
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